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Abstract
This paper investigates changes in the composition and spatial distribution of income
poverty in London from ൢൠൠൡ to ൢൠൡൣ, and considers them as evidence of gentrification.
It is first argued that income poverty measures address some of the shortcomings of con-
ventional occupational class statistics in gentrification research. The empirical analysis,
using poverty proxies and spatial microsimulation income estimates, show that in the
poorest, eastern parts of inner London, poverty rates fell. Here there was intense devel-
opment and valorisation of land and housing around the financial districts, rapid popula-
tion growth, and absolute falls in the numbers of the out-of-work poor. Poverty rates rose
in the relatively disadvantaged parts of outer London. This is accounted for partly by
rises in out-of-work poverty, but predominantly by the impoverishment of low-income
workers through their wages becoming insufficient relative to housing costs. The paper
thus confirms broad changes in the spatial distribution of poverty identified in recent
studies, while pointing to the exploitation of labour and land as central mechanisms in
explaining patterns of gentrification and proletarianisation in the city.
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1 Introduction
After decades of population decline after WorldWar ൢ, London has undergone a remark-
able reversal of fortunes since around the mid-ൡ൩൨ൠs. In the first decade of the ൢൠൠൠs this
was apparent in official statistics, which showed how London increasingly drew apart
from the rest of the UK in measures of aggregate economic performance. It was equally
visible in the physical form of the city, which became denser and taller and — accord-
ing to taste — either adorned or blotted by new “landmark” buildings providing offices,
leisure and residence to an international economic elite. Economic growth and physical
development were, however, spatially uneven processes. They were uneven in the sense
that London, taken as a whole, diverged further from its hinterland, the rest of the UK,
but also in that this growth and development was most pronounced in certain parts of
the inner urban area.
Some of the same parts of inner London appear, according to deprivation indices, to
have undergone considerable change in their socio-economic composition. For decades
up to the turn of the century and beyond, some of London’s inner districts featured as
among the most deprived in Britain according to official indices. The worsening of so-
cial conditions in these areas in the ൡ൩൨ൠs drew the attention of major poverty reports in
the ൡ൩൩ൠs (Barclay and Hills ൡ൩൩൥, pp.൧-൩,ൢ൩-ൣൡ,൥൤). In the ൢൠൠ൤ English Indices of Mul-
tiple Deprivation (IMD), based on ൢൠൠൡ data, boroughs like Hackney, Tower Hamlets,
Newham and Islington had intensity and extent of neighbourhood deprivation compa-
rable to the most disadvantaged urban districts of the de-industrialising north in Greater
Manchester, Merseyside and Humberside. The report on the most recent edition of the
IMD, ൢൠൡ൥, identifies several of these same boroughs as having the rapidest falls in some
measures of relative deprivation since the previous (ൢൠൡൠ) edition, sufficient to take them
out of the “top ൢൠ” most deprived nationally (Gill ൢൠൡ൥, pp.ൡൡ-ൡ൥). This confirms a trend
already observable in ൢൠൡൠ (Leeser ൢൠൡൡ).
That said, other recent observers have pointed to aspects of continuity and stability in
London in the ൢൠൠൠs. Of central importance to this paper, overall rates of income poverty
barely changed in London over the decade from ൢൠൠൠ, nor indeed from ൢൠൡൠ to the present
(Aldridge, Born, et al. ൢൠൡ൥, p.ൢൣ). Poverty after housing costs, the most meaningful of-
ficial measure available, remained at around ൢ൧-ൢ൨% of London’s population, and thus
far above poverty rates in the rest of the UK. This paper presumes that the presence of
both remarkable economic growth and persisting income poverty required a common
explanation, and should not be taken, as in commonplace comment, as a paradox and
a puzzle (Massey ൢൠൠ൧, pp.൥൤-൥൥). With this as starting point, it may surprise some to
learn that household income inequality in London did not, by some common measures,
increase over the decade (Aldridge, Born, et al. ൢൠൡ൥). Furthermore, analysis of censal
data points to a new stability over the last decade in the (occupational) class structure
of London, which in previous decades had shown evidence of a continuing “profession-
alisation” and decline of the “traditional” working class (Hamnett ൢൠൡ൥; Manley and
Johnston ൢൠൡ൤). From Census data, authors have concluded “London remains an ex-
tremely diverse place socio-economically, and … over the decade ൢൠൠൡ–ൡൡ changes in
൥
its socio-economic class structure and associated geography have not been extensive”
(Manley and Johnston ൢൠൡ൤, p.൦൤ൢ).
Against this background, this working paper has two purposes. The first, pursued in
the main empirical section below, is to present new evidence on changes in the spatial
distribution and composition of income poverty in London over the decade from ൢൠൠൡ
to ൢൠൡൡ. This confirms some of the findings already alluded to, such as notable falls in
income poverty in some inner London boroughs. In addition, however, it demonstrates
the significance of housing development and of local differences in the composition of
poverty to the interpretation of these findings. The second aim of the paper, developed
in the section which immediately follows, is to argue for the use of income poverty data
as quantitative evidence for gentrification as a supplement to the Census occupational
class data which have been the prevailing focus of the recent British academic literature.
Taking in-work poverty as an index of labour exploitation, the paper concludes that there
is not only clear evidence of gentrification in much of Inner East London, but also of
proletarianisation in some of the relatively disfavoured parts of Outer London.
২.২ Poverty research and gentrification studies
This paper adopts a descriptive and empirical stance towards the exclusively quantitative
data it reports. One cannot pretend, however, that these quantitative data, any more
than any other, merely present themselves, wertfrei, ready to be tidied up, shuffled into
graphs and decorated with some descriptive text. It is useful, therefore, to look briefly
at two principal fields of debate in which data about the distribution of poverty and
class have been used, analysed and represented. I label these fields of debate “urban
poverty research” and “gentrification studies”. Identifying these two strands is partly a
preliminary to the main argument, but serves also to point out that the formal exchanges,
such as citation and reference, have remained rather limited between the two fields.
The terminology and concerns of the first field, “urban poverty research”, will be recog-
nisable in much of this paper. In this field, income poverty is one a series of economic
and social problems which have emerged or appeared starker over the course of the last
decade in London. The unchanged prevalence of poverty in London is a problem in
itself, one prominent link in a chain of connected public problems, like inequality, hous-
ing, migration, pay, welfare benefits, taxation, governance and so forth. These problems
lend themselves to empirical analysis. Such analyses are connected to and taken up in
policy debates, to support claims for the importance of issues, and about which interests
ought to be favoured in policy in these discrete fields: should planning restrictions be
relaxed? should housing subsidies be reduced? should London have its own minimum
wage?
It is not this paper’s purpose to take in all recent work on poverty and inequality in
London, let alone to venture along the chain of problems and their associated social sci-
entific analyses. Two series of such publications, however, nicely exemplify both the
൦
concerns of such research and its contribution to the empirical material which follows
here. The first series are the London Poverty Profiles produced by the New Policy Insti-
tute (Aldridge, Born, et al. ൢൠൡ൥; Aldridge, Parekh, et al. ൢൠൡൣ). These provide compre-
hensive analysis of data on poverty, inequality and deprivation in London, accompanied
by illuminating commentary. The last (ൢൠൡൣ) Profile noted the tendency of poverty to
move outwards in London and the differential effects of recession on jobs in Inner and
Outer London, further contributing to this trend. The reports also note the prevalence of
low pay in London: that is, wages which even in full-time employment are insufficient
to provide basic living standards. A corollary of this is the extensive and growing depen-
dence of many employed Londoners on Housing Benefit or Local Housing Allowance
to meet their rent.
The second series of publications comprises work on the distribution of income in Lon-
don undertaken within the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (Lupton et al. ൢൠൡൣ;
Vizard et al. ൢൠൡ൥). CASE’s reports focus rather more on changes in the distribution of
income, wages and wealth, and the consequences of these for measures of inequality.
CASE’s analyses are usefully divided into two time periods, and these divisions will be
pertinent to the interpretation of the findings presented here. The first report covered the
period from ൢൠൠൡ to ൢൠൠ൧, a period of relatively stable accumulation, modest growth in
wages, and modest falls in poverty. The more recent publication reprises these analyses
from ൢൠൠ൧ to ൢൠൡൣ, from the banking crisis and ensuing recession to the first half or so
of the period of Coalition goverment from May ൢൠൡൠ to May ൢൠൡ൥.
The researchers argue that the early half of this period after the financial crisis saw lower
real incomes relatively protected, as household incomes were protected by both the “au-
tomatic stabilisers” of the welfare system and the counter-cyclical fiscal policy of the
government to ൢൠൡൠ. However, with austerity — and even before the implementation of
cuts to social security benefits—real incomes fell sharply from ൢൠൡൠ, and fell most at the
bottom end of the income distribution. As the NPI reports, CASE’s authors attach cen-
tral importance to housing costs and low pay as explanations of explaining rising poverty
and income inequality in London in the period from ൢൠൠ൧ as whole (Vizard et al. ൢൠൡ൥,
p.ൡ൤). This paper, then, is intended in part as a contribution to the line of policy-oriented
investigation of poverty undertaken in these reports and elsewhere.
“Gentrification studies” is another field in which sustained empirical attention has been
paid to changes in the socio-economic composition of the city, albeit one in which the
neighbourhood rather than the city takes centre stage. There has been a whole subgenre
— arguably a distracting one (Slater ൢൠൠ൦) — of work on the definition of gentrifica-
tion. For the purpose at hand, gentrification is understood as changes in the composition
and character of urban localities in favour of newer residents with more resources and
at the expense of existing residents with fewer resources; I will return shortly to the
reasons for the awkwardness of this formulation. An important development of work
on gentrification since around ൢൠൠൠ has been to underscore that such observed changes
are not simply local consequences of arbitrary changes in fashion and taste. Gentrifi-
cation is, rather, closely connected to urban inequality, uneven access to housing and
൧
other resources, and economic organisation, and, further, gentrifying neighbourhoods
are produced, with state policy on land, housing, and welfare having an instrumental
role (Hackworth and Smith ൢൠൠൡ).
Here we see some of the terms of art of urban poverty research — inequality, policy,
economic growth— recurring. However, it is only really in housing policy that there has
been a much sustained engagement between policy-oriented research and academic or
activist work on gentrification. Within Britain, at least, the bulk of empirical quantitative
research on gentrification has operationalised its object through the use of housing tenure
or occupational class variables, and has drawn mostly on the Censuses of Population.
Income poverty and deprivation analyses have attracted relatively little attention. There
are reasons for thinking this may have been a missed opportunity.
২.৩ Class and poverty as indices of gentrification
The preceding working definition of gentrification used the ungainly phrase “residents
with more [or fewer] resources” to describe its central empirical claim. Why not refer
to owner-occupiers and renters, or to the middle and working classes? And what virtue
might there be in the use of income poverty as a index of gentrification? Whilst there is
almost certainly consensus that gentrification involves an inequality of status, resources
or power between the existing and incoming residents, there is much less consensus on
which dimension is important, and, crucially, how it ought to be measured. This varies
between countries, even within the english-speaking world, with a British emphasis on
social class and an American emphasis on income, not to mention the significantly dif-
ferent configurations of tenure and race in the respective countries. It also varies between
authors, and even single authors in a single text sometimes slide between referring to,
say, “middle-class” and “more affluent” households.
Classic accounts of gentrification, such as the early work of Ruth Glass and Neil Smith
noted changes in tenure from renting to owner-occupation as a index of neighbourhood
gentrification. But in London, say, with a large, growing and differentiated private
rented sector, there is no reason to suppose that “upward” changes in socio-economic
composition should correspond in any simple way to changes in tenure composition.
This holds even if, conversely, given tenure changes such as the removal of social ten-
ants might with certainty entail changes in social composition. For this reason, even if
housing policy and economics rightly remain salient in the study of gentrification pro-
cesses, housing tenure itself is of limited use in measuring gentrification.
In recent British research at least, it has been claimed that there is “wide agreement that
class should be the undercurrent in the study of gentrification” (Slater ൢൠൠ൦, p.൧൤ൢ). The
problem however remains that it is not obvious what conceptualisation of class is the
appropriate one, nor how such a concept might be operationalised in order to perform a
quantitative assessment of gentrification. There are longstanding sociological disputes
about the fundamental basis and measurement of class (see for example Nichols ൡ൩൧൩;
൨
Wright ൢൠൠ൩), and an equally longstanding tradition of describing and disputing changes
in class structure and class relations. Recent attempts to refound class classifications
have not received general acceptance within social science, with objections on both con-
ceptual and empirical grounds (Mills ൢൠൡ൤; Savage et al. ൢൠൡൣ). Such reformulations are
yet further from the adoption into official statistics which would be a prerequisite of their
use in large-scale empirical work.
British official statistics have in recent decades in the Census settled on a primarily
occupation-based class scale, the NS-SEC. The use of such statistics in more or less their
given form has produced work of considerable empirical value, such as recent analyses
comparing the ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ spatial distribution of NS-SEC classes in London (Man-
ley and Johnston ൢൠൡ൤). However, even in such careful work, the limits of occupational
class become apparent. One is the treatment of “intermediate” classes, that large body of
people who are neither unambiguously middle- or working-class in a traditional sense.
Even authors who use such classifications admit that this is a class— if such it can justly
be termed — which “has become a major feature of inner London’s more mixed, resi-
dential landscape” but “some of whose members have affinities with the middle rather
than the working class and vice versa (ibid., p.൦൤ൡ). At the same time, such analyses
are bedevilled by concurrent changes over time in local composition and city-wide class
structure (Hamnett ൢൠൠൣ, ൢൠൠ൩). One response to such difficulties has been to reject the
uncritical use of occupational class statistics with their central emphasis on employment
relations as an inadequate operationalisation of class (Slater ൢൠൡൠ, pp.ൡ൧ൢ-൧ൣ).
Such critique, however, still does not answer the wish for a measure that might be used in
quantitative study of gentrification. Using measures of low income or income poverty as
indices of gentrification is familiar in the US literature, but less so in the British context.
Erik Olin Wright, however, has argued the case for looking at poverty as a consequence
of class relations specifically in “The Class Analysis of Poverty” (Wright ൡ൩൩൤, Ch.ൢ).
More specifically, he starts from a concept of exploitation, it being “a particular type of
antagonistic interdependency of material interests of actors within economic relations”,
and specifies three criteria for it, inverse welfare, exclusion and appropriation (ibid.).
From these he derives two sub-types of poverty: “the working poor” and “the under-
class” (ibid., pp.൤൦ff). Briefly put, the former are those both oppressed and exploited,
the latter those who are oppressed and excluded, their labour power unwanted or un-
needed in capitalist production.
For our present purpose, the value of Wright’s insight is to suggest that income poverty
is, if not class itself, an indicator of position in class relations.ൡ It thereby suggests a
way of using an operationalisable construct, poverty, to conduct empirical analysis of
gentrification. It answers one of the difficulties of occupational class constructs, that
of those people neither middle- nor working-class by giving an unambiguous criteria:
the “working poor”, those who sell their labour yet receive insufficient recompense to
ൡ It should be noted thatWright’s work of social class is very considerably more expansive and elaborated
than the single aspect touched on here.
൩
provide a normatively minimally adequate standard of living, count among those with
less access to resources.
A further attraction of the scheme is the analytical distinction it draws between working
poverty and out-of-work poverty within class relations. This allows us to distinguish the
displacement or absorption into the labour market of “the underclass” (to use Wright’s
term) from the prevalence of exploited labour or proletarianisation. A key finding from
the empirical analysis that follows is the spatial divergence of these trends in London
over the ൢൠൠൠs. A further advantage is that, by using poverty standards which include
housing costs, the concept of exclusionary access to resources is extended beyond the
employment situation to property relations in housing. Thus the price of housing and
access to it are drawn into the definition of position in class relations. Thus, the anal-
ysis shows both if and where privatisation and commoditisation of housing withdraws
it from the reach of the “underclass”, and where people remain or fall into exploitative
relations.
This paper certainly does not make the claim that income poverty is obviously superior
to all other measures as a yardstick for measuring gentrification. Before turning to the
methods used, a couple of conceptual shortcomings of poverty as a gentrification mea-
sure should be noted. One is that, just like occupational class, any actual operationali-
sation of income poverty is conventional and to some degree arbitrary. Those who are
defined as “poor” according to one poverty threshold and set of ancillary conventions
(household-size equivalisation, treatment of housing costs) may not be by another. It is
not claimed that the particular operationalisation of poverty that, as described shortly, is
used in the empirical analysis is the best. It is, rather, currently well-known and widely
used, and incorporates the central concept of a household income sufficient to provide a
minimal normatively acceptable standard of living, even if the definition of that standard
is to some degree arbitrary.
It has already been said that poverty is not itself class, but is useful as an indicator of
position in class relations of exploitation. Poverty may be a transitory state, whereas
class, sociologically, implies a relatively durable characteristic of persons, with subjec-
tive and inter-subjective dimensions, and a principle of social stratification of which
money is a part, but not the whole. Using poverty statistics as an index of gentrifica-
tion has nothing to say about possible changes in the character of neighbourhoods, and
the important social and cultural dimensions of inclusion, exclusion and displacement
in them. The following analysis does not imply that those are considered unimportant
or epiphenomenal.
The concept of displacement is both central and contentious in gentrification studies.
There is debate, for example, about whether some kinds of “redevelopment” in British
cities proceed without displacement of existing residents, and are thus not “gentrifi-
cation” (many contributions to this debate are reviewed in Davidson and Lees ൢൠൡൠ).
Certainly the provision of positive evidence that existing residents have been physically
displaced sets a high burden of proof on those who wish to claim that gentrification is
ൡൠ
taking place (Slater ൢൠൠ൦, p.൧൤൨). Not only must something be shown to have occurred
(people moving away, a change in the character of the neighbourhood), but this change
must also be shown to be attributable to the recomposition of the neighbourhood and be
demonstrated to be involuntary or disadvantageous.
Most poverty statistics, including those shortly presented, are cross-sectional counts
or rates for spatial units, and thus provide no more evidence than Census data on dis-
placement. The analysis that follows has nothing direct to say about the changing cir-
cumstances of individuals and households over time, let alone the structure of motiva-
tions and constraints within which such changes have unfolded. Nonetheless, since the
poverty concept used is centrally one of unequal material access to resources, at least
some moves of households between areas reflect not choice, but a lack of it. Thus area
aggregate changes in poverty may be evidence for, if not a demonstration of, gentrifica-
tion. Furthermore, we should apply a similar burden of proof to sanguine interpretations
of neighbourhood falls in poverty, which explain them through the beneficial workings
of the economy, labour market policy or efforts at social inclusion.
2 Methods and Sources
The empirical analysis which follows seeks to describe changes in the spatial distribution
of income poverty from ൢൠൠൡ to ൢൠൡൡ; one dataset used allows the analysis to be extended
to ൢൠൡൣ. These are, as already noted, conventional comparisons of cross-sectional area
data, albeit data hitherto not used for such analysis, and in part wholly new and presented
here for the first time. In addition, matched information on population density and on
housing development are given in support of parts of the interpretation given to the re-
sults. Two complementary approaches are adopted to the description of changes in the
spatial distribution of poverty. One uses standard small-area spatial units comparing a
poverty proxy rate over time. The other, drawing on the differentiation discussed above
between the “underclass” and the “working poor”, looks at area changes over time in
the composition of poverty. For the sake of tractability of analysis and intelligibility
of results, the larger spatial scale of boroughs is employed in this analysis. At neither
the small-area nor the district scale are standard UK official survey measures of income
poverty (derived from the Family Resources Survey) available. The analysis thus em-
ploys two techniques to overcome this absence, administrative proxies for poverty and
estimation of income distributions by means of spatial microsimulation.
৩.২ Administrative poverty proxies
The first section uses a proxy measure of area poverty rates, the Unadjusted Means-
Tested Benefits Rate (UMBR). This dataset, produced by CASE as part of the Social
Policy in a Cold Climate programme, provides observations annually from ൢൠൠൡ to ൢൠൡൣ
for around ൤ൠ,ൠൠൠ small geographic units in Britain, including somewhat under ൥,ൠൠൠ in
London; it is publicly available (Fenton ൢൠൡ൥). UMBR is based on administrative data on
ൡൡ
major means-tested social security benefits, such as Income Support and Job-Seeker’s
Allowance.
Receipt of such benefits is a very strong predictor of income poverty at the household
level, and area rates of receipt have a strong linear corelation rates of income poverty
as measured by sample surveys (Fenton ൢൠൡൣ). UMBR rates, which are denominated by
estimated number of households, are not directly poverty rates, but are a validated proxy
for them. For the present purpose the advantages of this dataset lie in its geographic detail
and consistent measurement for the period of interest. It is measured to UK-standard
geographic boundaries, which enable it to be linked to other data sources, as here, where
it is examined against administrative data on dwelling value and numbers.
৩.৩ Spatial microsimulation of income
One disadvantage of UMBR is that it incorporates a set of essentially administrative
definitions of low income (means-test thresholds), rather than statistical ones. Varia-
tion over time and space in the relation between administrative definitions and a “real”
income-poverty concept are not easily quantified; UMBR does not, for example, con-
tain any direct observation of low wages or of housing costs. There are also systematic
differences between areas and between population subgroups, some of whom are ge-
ographically concentrated, in the take-up of means-tested benefits that are included in
UMBR (Bramley, Lancaster, and Gordon ൢൠൠൠ). This is a cause of error in them as a
poverty estimate, with the scale of this error hard to quantify. Lastly, UMBR provides
only a single household rate per-area per-year; no information on other characteristics
of the poor or the non-poor is given.
For all of these these reasons, the second empirical section uses income estimates derived
from a spatial microsimulation to describe changes in the composition of poverty at the
level of boroughs. The following is a brief overview of this method; it is treated more
extensively in an accompanying working paper, Microsimulation estimates of house-
hold income distributions in London boroughs, ৩১১২ and ৩১২২. The spatial microsimula-
tion estimates are produced by combining multiple local area census tables and tax data
with detailed sample survey information on income from the Family Resources Survey
and Households Below Average Income series. The survey years used are ൢൠൠൡ/ൠൢ and
ൢൠൡൡ/ൡൢ, which are used with ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ Census data respectively. The survey cases
from these years, with their detailed information on income, are “matched” or “fitted” to
household and adult characteristics in the local area by adjusting the survey weights. The
survey population is therebymade to resemble the local population on income-predicting
dimensions such as age, sex, occupational class, taxable income and household type.
This matched and reweighted survey data can then be used to estimate whatever features
of the local income distribution are of interest. This includes points in the distribution
(deciles, mean, median) and income-poverty rates by different thresholds and income
definitions. Unlike UMBR, these poverty and income statistics are not proxies but direct
ൡൢ
measures. These microsimulation estimates, whose underlying sources are independent
of those used in UMBR, have two main virtues for the following analysis. Firstly, they
measure income poverty directly in conventional terms, accounting for household size
and housing costs, and, secondly, they permit examination of the prevalence of poverty
in population subgroups.
3 The Spatial Redistribution of Poverty
Figure ൡ presents the distribution of poverty, based on the UMBR proxy, across Lon-
don in four years between ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൣ. In the diagram around ൤,൨ൠൠ base areal units,
Lower-Level Super Output Areas, are grouped into hexagonal zones. The space al-
lotted to inner London is increased to show the geographic trends more clearly. The
approximate boundaries of the five NUTSൢ areas of London, based on the Office for
National Statistics definitionൢ, are outlined with grey lines, whilst the approximate bor-
ough boundaries are shown in white.
The picture presented will be familiar from any number of mappings of income poverty,
material deprivation and social exclusion based on a wide variety of sources (for exam-
ple, McLennan et al. ൢൠൡൡ, p.൦൩). It shows the highest concentrations of poverty in inner
East London, particularly in the boroughs of Hackney, Tower Hamlets and Islington,
and extending into parts of Islington, Southwark and Lambeth. Although the areas with
the absolute highest poverty in ൢൠൠൡ were in inner London, parts of outer London also
have high poverty rates, notably in Brent, Croydon and Enfield.
The maps also show, however, changes in the spatial distribution of poverty over the pe-
riod. The poverty proxy rate fell sharply in the areas of its highest concentration in inner
East London. As already remarked, this is consistent with observed trends in official
deprivation indices (Leeser ൢൠൡൡ), and corresponds to those areas that have received the
greatest academic and media attention as “gentrifying” areas. In the same time period,
poverty rates have risen in several parts of outer London, above all in those parts which
started the period relatively deprived in comparison to outer London as a whole. This
change is brought out clearly in figure ൢ. In the most-changed parts of inner London,
UMBR rates fell by as much as ൡൢ percentage points (for reference, the most deprived
parts of inner East London having rates in ൢൠൠൡ in the range of ൣൠ to ൤ൠ). Inner West
London, however, shows no overall change, with small falls in poverty in some areas
and small rises in others.
City-wide underlying trends are shown in figure ൣ, which charts the aggregate UMBR
ൢ In ൢൠൡ൥ the definition of NUTS areas in London was substantially revised. The former NUTSൢ areas of
Inner and Outer London were abolished, the five former NUTSൣ areas were promoted to NUTSൢ areas,
and ൢൡ new NUTSൣ areas defined, each consisting of one or more boroughs. In this paper, Inner London
refers to all the local authorities in the old “Inner” NUTSൢ area: the City of London, Camden, Hammer-
smith and Fulham, Kensington and Chelsea, Wandsworth and Westminster (Inner London West) plus
Hackney, Haringey, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets (Inner
London East).
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Figure 1: Map of the distribution of UMBR poverty proxy rate
(claimants/households) in London, 2001, 2005, 2009 and 2013. Drawn
area sizes adjusted towards population size. The dark grey and white
lines show the approximate outlines of the NUTS2 divisions and of
individual boroughs respectively.
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Figure 2: Changes in the UMBR poverty proxy rate, showing the absolute differ-
ence between the 2001 and 2013 percentage rates. Drawn area sizes ad-
justed towards population size. The dark grey and white lines show the
approximate outlines of the NUTS2 divisions and of individual boroughs
respectively.
ൡ൤
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
2005 2010
Year
UM
BR
Inner
East
Inner
West
Outer
East & NE
Outer
South
Outer
West & NW
Figure 3: UMBR aggregate rates by NUTS2 areas, 2001 to 2013. The dotted lines
show the simple regression trend for each area over the period.
rate for the five NUTSൢ areas over the ൢൠൠൠs. Inner East London saw sharply falling
poverty rates, whilst all three Outer London areas had rising poverty. Overall, inner and
outer East London appear to be rapidly converging. The effects of the recession show
up here as a rise in the poverty rate (primarily due to increases in the number of Job-
Seeker’s Allowance claims). This rise was greater in outer London, and the recovery
from it slower; in all three outer London areas, the benefit-based proxy had not, by ൢൠൡൣ,
reached its pre-recession low.
৪.২ Population growth, densification and housing value
It is important to note that in many of the poorest neighbourhoods of inner London, the
UMBR rate decreased not primarily because the absolute number of poor people (the
numerator of the UMBR rate) fell, but because the total number of households in the
area (the denominator of the UMBR rate) rapidly rose. There is a consistent relation-
ship between dwelling density, poverty, and increase in population over the period. The
poorest neighbourhoods in ൢൠൠൡ were those then most densely built-up with dwellings.
These same dense, poor, inner London neighbourhoods were subject to the greatest in-
creases in dwelling density through net additions to the dwelling stock. The net upward
change in total household population in these areas was much greater than any growth
in the poor population, as measured by UMBR.
In the relatively deprived neighbourhoods of Outer London by contrast, increases in the
poor population were of similar size to the increases in the household totals, and poverty
rates rose. As figure ൤ shows, few parts of Outer London experienced anything like
the intensity of development and net additions to the household population. The most
ൡ൥
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Figure 4: Proportional change in the total number of households 2001 to 2013,
based on the UMBR dataset. Drawn area sizes adjusted towards popu-
lation size. The dark grey and white lines show the approximate outlines
of the NUTS2 divisions and of individual boroughs respectively.
intense development of housing occurred in the former Docklands, and in parts of Tower
Hamlets, Hackney and Islington, that is, surrounding the two main financial districts of
London, the City and the Docklands.
Furthermore, this housing, aswith that of developments further west on the river Thames,
was of high value relative to what stood there at the start of the period under study. Fig-
ure ൥ uses Council Tax banding information to show this upward shift in mean values
in inner East London and along the riverside. Council Tax bandings are preferred here
to market-sale prices as a measure of dwelling value because they are assessed from the
notional price at a fixed point in time, thus making values comparable without need to
adjust for overall house price inflation. Thus the shifts in mean value here reflect only
the effects of demolitions and additions to the housing stock: what kind of housing was
built, and what kind of housing was removed.
These initial results using a poverty proxy measure at neighbourhood level suggest that
poverty rates fell with considerable speed across broad parts of inner East London in the
ൢൠൠൠs. This was most pronounced in those areas where poverty was at the start of the
period highest. In so far as we take falling poverty rates to be an index of gentrification,
this indicates that gentrification proceeded apace across a broad sweep of inner London.
The finding is somewhat at odds with the conclusions drawn by others on the basis
of occupational class data, that there was “local gentrification” but “broad stability”
(Manley and Johnston ൢൠൡ൤). This points to the need to cross-check the results from
the poverty proxy with other sources, UMBR being especially sensitive to out-of-work
poverty, and to look more closely at the composition of poverty in regards to economic
activity. It also indicates the difficulty of judging what is “stability”, and what ought
to be deemed “slow” or “rapid” change. All of these points are taken up in the section
which immediately follows and again in the concluding discussion.
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Figure 5: Shift inmean dwelling value, based onCouncil Tax records, 2001 to 2011.
Drawn area sizes adjusted towards population size. The dark grey and
white lines show the approximate outlines of the NUTS2 divisions and of
individual boroughs respectively.
The population and housing data show the clear connection in the case of inner East
London between the pattern of housing development and falls in poverty rates. These
falls were the result of increasingly dense settlement and development, and were accom-
panied by marked upward movement in the total and average value of housing capital.
This was evident above all in Tower Hamlets. The development of such areas was ex-
plicitly foreseen in planning documents, and happened on sites that “evince that mix
of relative deprivation and development potential which promises a substantial uplift in
value, given the right catalytic boost” (Keddie and Tonkiss ൢൠൡൠ, p.൥൨). The contribu-
tion of net additional housing and population growth to reducing poverty rates — but
not numbers — confirms the relevance of the academic debate, touched on in the intro-
duction, on “new-build gentrification” (Davidson and Lees ൢൠൡൠ). However, it should
be noted that the preceding analysis only shows net additions; it does not reveal what
proportion were built on formerly industrial or commercial land, and what proportion
on sites where existing lower-value and often public housing was first demolished. The
dwelling stock data used offers further opportunities to investigate this question, but this
lies beyond the central argument of this paper.
However, the trends across the city as a whole suggest that the role of new-build housing
ought not to be overstated.ൣ In much of inner West London, poverty rates also fell, albeit
more slowly and from a lower base than in inner East. This occurred without the rapid
new development and, riverside sites aside, the upward movement in mean housing base
value (market prices, of course, increased rapidly). In much of the relatively prosperous
parts of Outer London, the analysis of poverty rates does confirm a picture of “broad
stability” rather than rapid change. Nonetheless, the poverty proxy data suggests that
many relatively disadvantaged parts of Outer London saw increases in poverty rates, in
ൣ I am grateful to Rachel Aldridge and Antoine Paccoud for drawing my attention to this.
ൡ൧
boroughs on the administrative boundaries of the city such as Enfield, Hillingdon and
Croydon. To develop the interpretation of these complex and varying findings, we now
proceed to the results of the spatial microsimulation exercise.
4 The Changing Structure of Poverty
The remaining results presented in this paper come from borough-level income and
poverty simulations using Households Below Average Income and census data. The
simulations employ a standard notion of reported income from all sources (earnings,
benefits, investments), which is deemed shared within a benefit unit (roughly, a family),
adjusted for the number of adults and children who live on that income, and measured
after housing costs have been deducted in order to give a residual income available for
consumption. A person is defined as poor when the benefit unit of which they are a
member has such an income which is less than ൦ൠ% of the national median.൤ These sim-
ulations imply London-wide poverty rates and income distributions that are consistent
with those derived directly from HBAI.൥
The purpose of this analysis is first to confirm the spatial trends found in the analysis
of the UMBR poverty proxy using this conventional income-based poverty definition
rather than the administrative one implicit in UMBR. Confirming the trends, broadly
of falling poverty in parts of inner London and rising poverty in part of outer London,
should provide supporting evidence of the scale and extent of gentrification in the period
of interest. Further, the simulation data will allow us to examine the composition of
poverty. Specifically, we will be interested in changes in the relative distribution of in-
work and out-of work poverty, only the latter of which is directly observed in the UMBR
measure.
Before pursuing this analysis, it ought briefly to be noted that the spatial microsimula-
tions compare two snapshots in time. Since the estimation method relies on population
census data, the time periods compared are, as described above, ൢൠൠൡ (using ൢൠൠൡ Cen-
sus data and HBAI ൢൠൠൡ/ൠൢ) and ൢൠൡൡ (using that year’s Census and HBAI ൢൠൡൡ/ൡൢ). The
changes in borough poverty rates and income that are now presented reflect a wide vari-
ety of effects over this decade, including the movement of people, the changing circum-
stances of households, altered tax and benefit regimes, conditions in the labour market,
and changes to the housing stock.
As background information, median real income AHC rose in London from ൢൠൠൡ/ൠൢ up
until ൢൠൠ൧/ൠ൨, but then fell back sharply, such that it was no higher at the end of the
period than the start.൦ Mean real income, which, unlike the median, is influenced by the
൤ The appendices to the published HBAI reports give details of the definitions and procedures used in
income measurement, see; (Department for Work and Pensions ൢൠൡ൤).
൥ The simulation estimates have high uncertainty at the top of the income distribution, and in boroughs
with many extremely high-income households.
൦ Table ൢ.൥ts in the supplementary material to the HBAI analysis report gives the official median and
mean average incomes by region, based on three-year rolling averages.
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Figure 6: Borough real median incomes (AHC, equivalised), 2001 and 2011, in
2011/12 prices. Points are shaded according to the proportion of net
household income derived from earnings in 2001.
values of top incomes, in fact fell over the decade as a whole. Changes in borough me-
dian income plotted in figure ൦ nicely illustrate the net effects of the period of growth and
the first years of the recession. Median incomes in the poorest boroughs were flat over
the decade, whilst median incomes fell more sharply in more wealthy boroughs.൧ The
lowest-income boroughs in inner London had the lowest shares of household income
deriving from earnings, whilst income from benefits was relatively protected against in-
flation in the early pre-coalition phase of the recession. CASE’s more recent and shorter-
run analysis from ൢൠൠ൧/ൠ൨ to ൢൠൡൢ/ൡൣ, however, shows that in London, falls in income
were proportionally greatest in the bottom half of the income distribution (see Vizard
et al. ൢൠൡ൥, p.ൡൣ); the concluding discussion takes up the question of possible trends after
the period for which data are reported here.
൧ The data point on the far right hand sidewith an extremely large fall in real median income is Kensington
and Chelsea. Because of the particularly unusual composition of the borough, estimates of middle and
higher incomes for it are subject to greater uncertainty than in other boroughs.
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Figure 7: Change in estimated income poverty rates (<60% national median in-
come, equivalised after housing costs) by borough, 2001 to 2011.
৫.২ Poverty change by district
Reprising the analysis above of the changing spatial distribution of poverty, figure ൧
charts boroughs’ poverty rates based on the ൢൠൠൡ simulation against their rate in ൢൠൡൡ.
Against the background of a London-wide poverty rate that was almost unchanged, bor-
oughs below and right of the dotted line had falling poverty rates, boroughs above and
to the left, rising. This provides confirmation of the analysis of the UMBR poverty
proxy measure. The poorest boroughs in both ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ were in inner East London,
successively Newham, Tower Hamlet and Hackney, each of which had poverty rates of
greater than ൤ൠ%. However, poverty rates fell in all inner East boroughs, most markedly
in Islington (by ൩ percentage points) and Hackney (by ൧).
By contrast, poverty rates rose in all of the boroughs in West and South outer London,
and rose the most in the boroughs such as Croydon (South London, +൥%), Kingston-
upon-Thames (South-West, +൧%) Hillingdon (West, +൩%) and Enfield (North, +൦%).
The microsimulation results confirm the broad pattern of spatial redistribution found in
the proxy analysis, and indicate that the relative position of some boroughs has changed
considerably. Table ൡ summarises the position by NUTSൢ areas in ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ, and can
be compared to figure ൣ, above. It also shows poverty shares: whereas in ൢൠൠൡ, inner and
outer London had nearly even shares of the poor population (with inner London having
a smaller population), the balance had shifted by ൢൠൡൡ decisively to outer London (൥൨%
in outer vs ൤ൢ% in inner).
ൢൠ
Table 1: Estimated income poverty rates (people) and shares of all people in
poverty in NUTS areas of London, 2001 and 2011
Area Poverty Rate Poverty Share
2001 2011 2001 2011
London
Inner London 0.34 0.31 0.47 0.42
Outer London 0.24 0.28 0.53 0.58
Inner London
Inner - East 0.38 0.34 0.34 0.30
Inner - West 0.26 0.27 0.13 0.12
Outer London
Outer - East & NE 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.21
Outer - South 0.21 0.25 0.12 0.13
Outer - West & NW 0.24 0.29 0.21 0.24
There are, however, some differences between the two sources in both the scale of
changes and their relative extent in different parts of the city. One key difference to
the UMBR results is that poverty rates here appeared to rise the most in outer West and
South London, rather than in outer East. The following disaggregations of the poverty
rate help to account for this difference.
৫.৩ Poverty by economic status
One of the most marked changes in the structure of poverty in Britain over the ൢൠൠൠs was
the sharply increased proportion of the poor who are poor despite there being an adult in
work in the household.൨ This development was especially pronounced in London: “[a]
decade ago, the majority of children and adults in poverty in London were in workless
families (൥൥%); now the majority live in a family where someone is in work (൦ൠ%)”
(Aldridge, Born, et al. ൢൠൡ൥, p.ൢ൥). The spatial microsimulation estimates allow us to
look at how this has affected different boroughs within the city. Figure ൨ gives a decom-
position of the effects of this shift by borough. It shows the net change in the number
of the poor in each borough, according to whether the benfit unit in which they live has
any person in employment. State income support to low-income pensioners increased
substantially over the period, and therefore benefit units where no-one is working but
where the head of the unit or their spouse is aged over ൦ൠ are separated out and shown
in a separate column.
Apparent overall is the trend for out-of-work poverty to fall, and for in-work to increase.
൨ Table ൣ.൥ts of HBAI’s analysis report presents a time series. In ൢൠൠൡ/ൠൢ, ൤ൠ% of low-income households
had an adult in work; by ൢൠൡൡ/ൡൢ this had reached ൥ൣ%.
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Figure 8: Net change in total people in poverty, by economic status of benefit unit,
by borough, 2001-2011.
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The balance between these tendencies is, however, very different from borough to bor-
ough. In gentrifying boroughs, notably Islington, Camden and Hackney, the absolute
falls in workless poverty were greater than the rise in in-work poverty; this, combined
with the increases in the size of the resident population, accounts for the sharp falls in
poverty rates in these boroughs. In other parts of inner East London, such as Tower Ham-
lets, Newham and Southwark, increases in in-work povertymore than offset falling num-
bers out of work. The more modest falls in overall poverty rates in these boroughs are
thus attributable to the growth in population, and smaller reductions in poverty among
those above working age.
In the boroughs of outer London, falls in out-of-work poverty were small or negligi-
ble. Two of the most strongly “declining” boroughs, Enfield and Hillingdon, recorded
small increases in the absolute numbers in out-of-work poverty. The major changes
to poverty rates in outer London are the consequences not of changes in worklessness
(the “underclass”, in Wright’s terms), but by very large increases in in-work poverty
(“exploitation”). Rises in private housing costs, relative to the wages of lower-income
workers, impoverished tens of thousands of households in these boroughs.
As before, these are comparisons of cross-sections at two time points, which do not allow
us to attribute importance to the relative effects of local changes in labourmarkets, wages
and housing costs, and population movement into and out of each borough. For the pop-
ulation above working age, the increased generosity of income transfers to retired people
played amajor role in the falling poverty counts recorded for this group in every borough.
This cross-sectional analysis does make much clearer that it is not only the distribution
of poverty, but its composition that has changed. Even in the most strongly gentrify-
ing boroughs, rising in-work poverty has tempered the effects of falling worklessness,
whilst in outer London, it has outweighed and magnified changes to worklessness in its
contribution to rising overall income poverty.
৫.৪ Poverty by housing tenure
Gentrification in London in the ൢൠൠൠs was marked not, as in classic accounts, by the
replacement of renting by owner-occupation, but by the rapid expansion of private rent-
ing. At the same time, social rented housing declined in share and importance as a means
of providing housing to low-income households, whilst state subsidies to private rents
through Local Housing Allowance (Housing Benefit) increased. Alongside this, the gap
between poverty rates before and after housing costs grew ever wider, and the hous-
ing circumstances of the income-poor in different parts of the city are thus of particular
interest.
Figure ൩ presents the net absolute change in the population in poverty in each borough by
housing tenure. The unambiguously gentrifying boroughs of inner East London again
present a distinct pattern. The numbers in low income in social housing fell — in some
boroughs, like Southwark, because social housing was sold off or demolished in greater
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Figure 9: Net change in total people in poverty, by housing tenure, by boroughs
2001 to 2011.
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quantity than it was replaced — but also because the relative circumstances of social
tenants somewhat improved. Social renting remained in ൢൠൡൡ/ൡൢ much the poorest hous-
ing tenure, but poverty rates fell; this is in part accounted for by the relatively large
proportion of social tenants who are above retirement age and who thus benefited from
the more generous income transfers just mentioned. In inner east London, the offsetting
of falls in out-of-work poverty by rises in in-work poverty is mirrored in falls in poverty
in social renting and rises in private renting.
Rates of poverty among private tenants and owner-occupiers increased London-wide.
In the relatively declining boroughs of outer London, the increases in the population
of low-income households has occurred entirely within private housing. This is again
in part attributable to the rapid growth of the private rented sector, but also to the high
proportion of private tenants - and in some cases, also owner-occupiers - on low incomes
in these areas.
5 Discussion
It was already known that economic growth and physical development in London in the
ൢൠൠൠs were accompanied by a rise in in-work poverty and, further, no decrease in the
overall poverty rate. The data presented here show that whilst city-wide poverty rates
hardly changed, there was a marked spatial redistribution of poverty in the city, from
the inner city to the suburbs. As argued in the introduction, if income poverty is an
indicator of class position, then this is evidence for gentrification occurring across inner
East London.
In itself this may not be an especially surprising or novel conclusion. What the analysis
adds is firstly a new view of extent and speed. As noted above, cross-Census anal-
ysis using occupational class categories has pointed to overall stability and evidence
of local gentrification between ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ. Some popular media representations of
gentrification, in focusing on the most egregious cultural and economic contrasts be-
tween new and existing residents, tend to convey a view of gentrification as occurring in
“hotspots”. The quantitative analysis presented above suggests, in contrast, that changes
in socio-economic composition consistent with gentrification were taking place across
broad swathes of the inner city.
As well as this revised appreciation of extent, the data offer a new perspective on the
speed of socio-spatial change, which is inherently a matter involving a degree of judge-
ment. If one is prepared to accept the changing spatial distribution of poverty as a yard-
stick of gentrification, how might one judge the magnitude of the changes over a decade
from the material presented? After all, parts of London now often thought of as little
blemished by deprivation — Chelsea, the West End or Notting Hill — were, in recent
decades, thought thoroughly disreputable. From the present data, granted, the relativi-
ties of poverty rates at the scale of boroughs and wide zones of the city have not within
a decade been upturned. Inner east London, and the boroughs of Newham and Tower
ൢ൥
Hamlets foremost within it, were at the end of the period the poorest in London, just as
they were at the start.
I would argue, however, that the net impression is of change of unusual rapidity. To
give just a couple of examples: Islington, which featured in the England-wide “top five”
of deprivation extent and rank in the ൢൠൠ൤ Indices of Multiple Deprivation, now has a
poverty rate lower than outer boroughs like Enfield, Redbridge, Hillingdon and Croy-
don, which did not appear in the top ൥ൠ (Noble et al. ൢൠൠ൤, p.ൡൠൣff). The ൢൠൡൡ poverty
rate in Brent is now similar to that in Hackney, which has consistently been identified
by deprivation indices as one of the most deprived local authorities in England. Such
changes over a decade in the relative position of larger spatial aggregates like boroughs
are really quite rare in recent British economic geography. The relative positions of de-
prived districts in the Midlands and North have changed little over recent decades (see
for example Gill ൢൠൡ൥, pp.ൡ൤-ൡ൥), with the most recent ups and downs of economic cycles
if anything reinforcing these disparities (Lee ൢൠൡൢ).
One of the consequences of the spatial redistribution of poverty in London is that it has
effected the greater dispersion of poverty that, under the banner of “mixed communities”,
caught the eye of policy-makers and aroused the interest, skepticism, and sometimes
ire, of researchers in the first decade of the ൢൠൠൠs (Bond, Sautkina, and Kearns ൢൠൡൠ).
The convergence of poverty rates between inner and outer London, and falls in poverty
in the highest-poverty neighbourhoods imply just the kind of deconcentration that was
sought. Although the housing data show the spatial coincidence of housing development
and re-development and falls in poverty, it is impossible to make an assessment of the
contribution of explicitly “mixed communities” policies to the trends. Here, it is more
important to underline that the convergence of poverty rates is not only a consequence
of gentrification of the inner city, but of proletarianisation in suburban areas.
Other poverty reports have highlighted the worsening of a range of social and economic
indicators in some outer London boroughs (Aldridge, Born, et al. ൢൠൡ൥, p.ൡൣ). The anal-
ysis in this paper shows, however, the striking divergence of trends in the composition
of poverty. In inner London, the falls were in out-of-work poverty, the “oppressed” and
“excluded”, be that by displacement or absorption into paid labour. But in outer London
it is the increase in in-work poverty, exploitation of labour, that accounts for the in-
creases in poverty there. It reflects unequal and inequitable access to resources — most
notably, housing — and work that does not provide a minimally adequate income. One
attraction of using poverty measures as indices of gentrification in this way is that they
connect directly back to the political-economic fields, such as labour and land, where
poverty and inequality are produced. A valuable extension of the present work would
be to look at the domestic level, that is, at how changes in household composition have
varied between areas and how these have interacted with changes in aggregate poverty
rates.
As remarked at the outset, the trends took place against the backdrop of a period of rapid
growth in aggregate prosperity — financial crisis notwithstanding — and in the rate of
ൢ൦
value production in London as a whole. It is not novel to argue that London has high rates
of poverty because of its prosperity, not (mysteriously) despite it: “[w]ithin the global
city the dynamics of this particular form of growth produce poverty as well as wealth”
(Massey ൢൠൠ൧, p.൥൤-൥൥). Even so, the findings here confirm the need for distributional
analysis that looks within regional disparities, and confirm that, at a city level, poverty
reduction does not inevitably follow the accumulation of wealth.
One unwanted side-effect of the material presented here is to heighten the imbalance
of research attention given to London at the expense of other cities in the UK. It is not
here assumed that the trends of inner gentrification and suburban proletarianisation are
necessarily unique to London, a product of the city’s exceptionalism as against the RUK
(Rest of the United Kingdom). In fact, an important question arising from the analysis is
the degree to which the mode of urban development and its consequences for the spatial
distribution of poverty reflect London’s peculiarities as a world financial centre. Un-
fortunately in the UK, at least, comparative urban quantitative research is dominated by
a concern with aggregate economic output, innovation and skills, in which the connec-
tion between city spatial structure and economic organisation remains relatively obscure.
Themethods used here could fruitfully be applied to other cities to make an initial assess-
ment of gentrification trends outside London. Another promising direction in empirical
research would be to make greater use of the latest Census interaction data on migra-
tion, to give at least a snapshot of the contribution of migration to the redistribution of
poverty.
Lastly, if one part of this paper’s purpose has been to make the case for gentrification
in London from ൢൠൠൡ and ൢൠൡൡ occurring at a wider extent and more rapidly than other
analyses have suggested, it invites the question of what might be to come. Because of
the limitations of available data, the picture presented is already at the time of writing
three or more years out of date. In that time, even if the national economy does not
appear to have returned to a stable phase of accumulation, development and speculation
on inner London land and housing seems well “back on track”. The changes observed in
ten years already imply some re-evaluation of the relative position of whole boroughs.
It does not take much imagination to project the rate of change seen in the last decade
a further ten years forward (as the trend lines in figure ൣ rather crudely suggest), and to
foresee a new urban distribution of poverty. Boroughs like Hackney and Tower Hamlets
may well in the future have become “average”, with the poor predominantly housed in
the more peripheral, and currently less favoured, boroughs.
This will depend not only on “market forces”, but on recent and coming policy decisions
and their consequences. The most consequential changes since the period under analysis
are probably those made to welfare benefits, introduced by the last Coalition government
since ൢൠൡൠ, but many taking increasing effect only from ൢൠൡൢ or ൢൠൡൣ. These are, on
the one hand, a set of national changes to taxes and transfers whose effects are steeply
regressive (Browne and Elming ൢൠൡ൥). Since these apply the greatest proportional cuts
to the already-poor, they may not of course, immediately change the spatial distribution
of poverty in London, but will increase inequality of access to resources. Among these
ൢ൧
measures are however ones that have particularly severe implications for the poor in
London, such as the — potentially shrinking — cap on total benefits, and caps and
cuts to Local Housing Allowance (Aldridge, Parekh, et al. ൢൠൡൣ; Fenton ൢൠൡൡ; Hamnett
ൢൠൡൠ). These measures will have affected precisely the poor who (still) live in the more
expensive inner areas of London, whomust “choose” betweenmoving or remaning in yet
more straitened circumstances. Occupational class data for the city as a whole may show
that the “transformation of London from an industrial to a post-industrial city in terms of
the shift in employment structure [might have] now almost run its course” (Hamnett ൢൠൡ൥,
p.ൢ൤൥). The material presented here suggests that the spatial consequences of changing
class structure and class relations, as visible in gentrification, were and are still very
much in progress.
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